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When All Else Fails: Government as the Ultimate Risk Manager
DAVID A. MOSS
Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 2002
464 pp., ISBN: 0674007573, US$39.90 (paper)
Building on the work of an earlier generation of scholars, revisionist historians in
recent years have renewed the process of challenging the myth of American laissez-
faire. Without denying that an aversion to centralized state power is ostensibly
a fundamental part of American political culture, these historians have shown how,
paradoxically, most Americans have been willing to exercise the broad powers of
government while embracing an emotional commitment to individualism and
statelessness. David Moss’s When All Else Fails is one of the latest and finest
contributions to this ongoing revision.
Moss contends that the management of risk has always been one of the state’s most
potent yet subtle functions in a modern capitalist society. By risk management he
means not only government regulations that prohibit certain activity and hence
reduce risk, but more importantly those laws and policies that shift risk between
parties and/or spread risk over a broad range of groups. From corporate limited
liability, which shifts the risk of business default from shareholders to creditors, to
product liability laws, which transfer the risk of injury from unsafe products from
consumers to manufacturers, Moss charts how the state has played a pivotal role
throughout American history as the ultimate risk manager.
Using several well-researched case studies of risk management policy, Moss distills
some general themes about the historical development of American law and political
economy. He notes, for example, that policymakers have used a variety of flexible risk
management tools to achieve changing social objectives—tools that Moss finds
‘surprisingly sophisticated in their economic treatment of risk and the government’s
role as a risk manager’ (p. 295). The remarkable plasticity of these risk management
policies suggests to Moss that reformers and lawmakers have been concerned not
just about solving what economists have identified as asymmetric information
problems in private insurance markets, but also about applying shifting social
priorities to correct different types of market failures during various periods of
American history.
More specifically, Moss claims that US risk management policy has evolved
sequentially through three distinct phases. During the first phase, from the founding
of the republic to roughly the end of the nineteenth century, lawmakers were
preoccupied with economic development; thus, they enacted policies such as
limited liability and bankruptcy that sought to mobilize capital and encourage
entrepreneurial activity. When social priorities shifted from a focus on economic
growth to worker security during the first half of the twentieth century, phase two
occasioned the enactment of employment-related social insurance programs like
workers’ compensation, which protected employees while reallocating the risk for
workplace hazards onto employers—who reformers argued were in a better position
to monitor and reduce such risks. In the third and final phase of risk management
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policy, from roughly 1960 to the present, policymakers have focused on providing
security for all citizens through such measures as federal disaster relief and
environmental liability.
Through these three phases of development, Moss persuasively documents how
risk management has allowed lawmakers to reconcile their desire to use state power
with their faith in free markets. By creating limited liability, bankruptcy protection,
workers’ compensation, social security, disaster relief, and a whole host of other risk
management laws, policymakers were able to reallocate risk with little government
spending or administrative bureaucracy. In this way, public risk management was
‘particularly well suited to the distinctive political and ideological character of the
United States: statism for anti-statists, so to speak’ (p. 17).
Although the synthetic case studies cover familiar terrain, Moss concisely
summarizes the current literature in each of the fields, and provides some compelling
rationales for why social priorities governing risk management may have changed
over time. For example, in the chapter on workers’ insurance (Chapter 6), Moss
recounts how the establishment of a mature economy and the growing number of
industrial accidents forced policymakers in the early twentieth century to shift their
energies away from business security to worker security. In so doing, reform-minded
politicians and social scientists spearheaded the movement for government-
mandated social insurance programs like workers’ compensation. Yet, because of
changing economic conditions and the forces allied against reform, policymakers
were less successful in their battle for unemployment insurance (at least until the
Great Depression) and compulsory health insurance, which resolutely remains a
‘glaring exception’ (p. 179) to the ubiquitous triumphs of public risk management.
In charting how a broad range of seemingly unrelated government policies shared
the logic of risk management, Moss’s chronological narrative claims to focus more on
the problems that policymakers were trying to solve than the interests that they were
trying to serve. This emphasis on ‘ideas and values’ as the prism for revealing ‘the
hidden coherence of American risk management policy’ (p. 21) seems to imply that
special interests and rent-seeking activities have played only a secondary role in
the lawmaking process. One wonders, though, if ideas and values could be so easily
divorced from interests and factions. If changing social priorities matter, so too must
the interests and pressures placed on politicians and policymakers to address certain
risks and not others. Certainly, as Moss admits, the failure of mandatory health care
in the United States is a result of the victory of special interests over public problem
solving.
Nevertheless, When All Else Fails ultimately posits a persuasive argument for
understanding how and why government actors throughout American history have
been able to manage a variety of risks—all while holding onto the fiction of limited
government.
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